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Misleading Policy Messages Derived from the Period TFR: Should 
We Stop Using It?
Tomáš Sobotka, Wolfgang Lutz
Abstract: Discussions about fertility in developed countries refer almost exclusive-
ly to the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR). We argue that the use of this indicator 
frequently leads to incorrect interpretations of period fertility levels and trends, re-
sulting in distorted policy conclusions and, potentially, in misguided policies. We il-
lustrate this with four policy-relevant examples, drawn from contemporary Europe. 
These illustrations show that the TFR (a) infl ates the presumed gap between fertil-
ity intentions and realised fertility, (b) erroneously suggests a signifi cant fertility 
increase in many countries of Europe after the year 2000, (c) often exaggerates the 
level of immigrants’ fertility and (d) frequently suggests that family-related policies 
which led to shorter birth spacing in fact brought an upward swing in fertility level. 
There seems to be no policy-relevant question for which the period TFR would be 
the indicator of choice to be preferred over other existing measures. 
Keywords: Fertility measurement · Total fertility · Policies · Fertility intentions · 
Fertility timing · Tempo effect
1 Introduction
Demography has been in the headlines in Europe for many years and is being dis-
cussed in the highest policy circles. The European Commission has set up several 
bodies that discuss the “demographic challenge” which Commission President Bar-
roso called one of the three main challenges for Europe, and in 2006 it published 
an offi cial communication on the topic that was presented to the media under the 
catching title “Five ways to defuse the demographic time bomb” (European Com-
mission 2006). The main policy paradigm conveyed in this communication as well 
as in speeches by family ministers around Europe is that young people want to have 
signifi cantly more children than they actually can afford to have and that the role of 
policy is to help them meet their family size desires. The resolution of the European 
Parliament on the demographic future of Europe (21 February 2008) proposes that 
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“the average birth rate in the European Union, which at 1.5 is abnormally low, is 
not a refl ection of women’s choice or of European citizens’ actual aspirations for 
creating a family.” As we will discuss below, this dominant and politically in many 
respects most convenient policy paradigm is largely based on an inappropriate use 
of the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR) which is compared with the cohort measure 
of desired family size as if it were itself a cohort measure of fertility. The same prob-
lem is found with another policy message that is being spread in Europe, namely the 
reversal of the declining fertility trends. Many politicians point at recent increases in 
the TFR as proof of their successful policies. In this study, we show that this trend 
often cannot be interpreted as a major turnaround in fertility because it is largely a 
consequence of the expected end of fertility postponement with government poli-
cies playing little role. Again, it is frequently the inappropriate use of the TFR that 
causes this misleading message.
Current public discussions about fertility trends and policies in developed coun-
tries almost exclusively refer to the period TFR which has become the ubiquitous 
fertility indicator of choice since the 1960s. It is commonly labeled as the “mean 
number of children per woman” by many demographers and statistical offi ces and, 
in consequence, also by journalists and politicians. This “synthetic cohort” interpre-
tation has become “deeply engrained in demographic thinking” (Ní Bhrolcháin 2007: 
44). In the public discourse relatively few references are made to cohort fertility as 
the adequate measure of fertility or to other indicators of period fertility that may 
better refl ect changes in fertility trends. Likewise, little reference is made to trends 
in the absolute number of births, which after all directly determine the future size 
and age structure of the population. Although all demographers should be aware 
of the serious problems associated with calling the period TFR the “mean number 
of children per woman,” a notion that only makes sense from a cohort perspec-
tive, there is hardly any public discussion about this. One important exception was 
a brief but heated public discussion in France in the early 1990s (see Keyfi tz 1993 
and a discussion on period fertility measures in Population 1994). Interestingly, this 
debate initially focused on the choice between period and cohort fertility measures 
and practically took for granted that the TFR represents the period fertility measure 
of choice. More recently the European Demographic Data Sheets (see VID 2010 for 
the latest one) have presented calculations of TFRs adjusted for “tempo effect” (i.e., 
the infl uence of changes in the timing of childbearing) along with traditional TFRs 
and cohort fertility measures in order to draw attention to this problem.
In discussing the use and usefulness of the period TFR this article partly relates 
to a recent work by Ní Bhrolcháin (2007, 2008) who distinguishes fi ve purposes 
(“reasons”) for which the TFR is being used and stresses that the choice of the fer-
tility indicator should be determined by the analyst’s objective. We go beyond this 
rather broad concept of measurement purposes and focus primarily on a policy-
relevant analysis of fertility trends and the questions surrounding it. We believe 
that demographers are expected to address specifi c questions that have societal 
or policy relevance and communicate their research to broader public. For some 
of these questions (such as, how many school-age children can we expect in ten 
years) the most appropriate demographic measure is the absolute number of births 
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(adjusted for child mortality and actual or expected migration), while for others (e.g. 
whether women have on average more children as a consequence of economic or 
political changes) measures of fertility level would provide the best answer. As we 
will discuss in the concluding section, the well-established TFR index does not give 
a satisfactory answer to such “real world” questions beyond the narrow arena of 
demographic modelling. 
In the following we will try to demonstrate that the period TFR is a very problem-
atic measure for assessing both the need for and the impact of policy changes and, 
more generally, for studying fertility trends in conjunction with selected social and 
economic trends. The excessive use of this problematic indicator, motivated in part 
by its wide availability for different countries and periods, can lead to erroneous 
conclusions. We will also address two natural follow-up questions (a) “Can we offer 
a better indicator of fertility level based on period information?”, and, if the answer 
is affi rmative, (b) “Is there any role left for the traditional period TFR?” Most of the 
article deals with the fi rst question and compares the messages derived from the 
period TFR with those derived from three alternative measures of period fertility 
and from completed cohort fertility (labelled CTFR). The second question, which is 
more radical in its potential implications, is addressed in the concluding section. 
The study fi rst reiterates the increasingly recognised fact that the period TFR can 
diverge considerably and systematically from the CTFR of women having children 
in a given period and this divergence can stretch over long periods of time. Timing 
effects and compositional factors affecting the period TFR may be seen as factors 
that confound the link between fertility and policy. We present four examples where 
the period TFR is typically used as a criterion for an evaluation of the “underlying” 
level of fertility, often referred to as “fertility quantum”1 (Bongaarts/Feeney 1998; 
van Imhoff 2001). We discuss whether the period TFR provides adequate and useful 
information about fertility levels and trends and whether this evaluation changes 
when other fertility indicators are used instead of the conventional period TFR. 
These illustrations show that the TFR (a) infl ates the presumed gap between fertil-
ity intentions and realised fertility, (b) erroneously suggests a signifi cant fertility 
increase in many European countries after the year 2000, (c) often exaggerates the 
level of immigrants’ fertility and (d) frequently suggests that family-related policies 
which led to shorter birth spacing in fact brought an upward swing in fertility level.
1 While there is no generally recognized defi nition of “fertility quantum”, in a period perspective 
it is often understood to refl ect the fertility level that is undistorted by confounding factors like 
changing timing (tempo) of childbearing or changing parity composition of the female popula-
tion. From a cohort perspective, the completed fertility rate is an unambiguous and undistorted 
indicator of fertility quantum. 
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2 Problems with the period TFR 
An increasing number of studies have demonstrated that the period TFR is a ques-
tionable measure of the level (quantum) of period fertility. It controls neither for 
the parity distribution of women nor for duration since the last birth, which are 
the key determining factors of reproductive behaviour (Rallu/Toulemon 1994a and 
Population 1994). Even more important, it is very sensitive to changes in the timing 
of childbearing, which infl ate the TFR when women have children at progressively 
earlier ages and depress it when they postpone childbearing to later reproductive 
ages (e.g. Ryder 1990; Bongaarts/Feeney 1998; Bongaarts 2002; Sobotka 2004a). 
The latter situation has been typical for most developed countries since the early 
1970s, when a long-term trend towards delayed parenthood started in western and 
northern Europe as well as in Canada, Japan and the United States (Kohler et al. 
2002; Sobotka 2004b). Various estimates suggested that without this shift in the tim-
ing of childbearing period TFR in the European Union would have been by 0.2 to 0.3 
higher in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Lutz et al. 2003; Sobotka 2004a), although 
this tempo effect was strongly regionally differentiated (Bongaarts 2002; Frejka/
Sobotka 2008; VID 2010).
As a result, the period TFR considerably diverged from the completed cohort 
fertility of women who were in their prime childbearing ages in a given period. 
Such a mismatch is not problematic for short-term fl uctuations, when period fertil-
ity measures should refl ect actual ups and downs in birth rates that may not affect 
ultimate cohort fertility trends (Ní Bhrolcháin 1992). However, this disagreement 
becomes problematic once the period TFR differs systematically from the corre-
sponding CTFR for two or three decades, as it has happened across much of the de-
veloped world. Figure 1 gives an illustration of this divergence for Denmark, where 
the gap between the period TFR and roughly corresponding CTFR averaged 0.26 in 
the period of 1970-1994 (the corresponding CTFR cannot be computed yet for the 
younger cohorts). 
Such a long-term divergence implies that the period TFR provides incorrect sig-
nals about the levels and trends of fertility and, by extension, also about the long-
term prospects of population replacement and population growth in the absence of 
migration. Such “incorrect signals” about fertility levels also have policy relevance 
as they may provide arguments that exaggerate the problem of “extremely low” 
fertility as well as the prospects of future population decline. Since the late 1970s, 
numerous statements and declarations of European politicians and parliaments 
about “insuffi cient birth rate” in Europe were fi rmly based on the observations of 
trends in the period TFR (see European Parliament 1984 and 2008). For example, 
the former Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs has proclaimed that “
[T]he fertility level for the EU as a whole is about 1.5 children per woman, well below 
the estimated replacement level of 2.1,” noting that some countries with “fertility 
rates of 1.3 children or less […] face dramatic population decreases” (Špidla 2007: 
2). Also these statements are grounded in the period TFR as there is no EU country 
at present where women born around 1970 are heading toward a completed fertility 
rate of 1.4 or below. 
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As an alternative to the period TFR, we use the following range of indicators of 
period fertility: 
(a) tempo-adjusted period TFR*s , proposed by • Bongaarts and Feeney (1998), 
which are based on birth-order specifi c correction in the conventional TFRs 
that refl ect the changes in the mean ages of fertility schedule; 
(b) an age and parity-specifi c index of fertility, PATFR (e.g. • Rallu/Toulemon 
1994a) which is based on a fertility table that controls for age and parity dis-
tribution of women of reproductive age
(c) its variant adjusted for tempo and variance effects, PATFR* (• Kohler/Or-
tega 2002). 
We also employ completed cohort fertility. The choice of these indicators is driv-
en in part by their suitability to address a given issue and in part by data availability. 
Fig. 1: Period TFR (1965-2008) and CTFR (women born in 1937-1967) in 
Denmark
Notes: Data on CTFR are based on two neighbouring cohorts; e.g. cohort 1937 refers to 
a cohort born in 1937-1938. A small fraction of the CTFR is estimated for women 
born in 1960-1967. Period data are compared with the cohort data for women 
born 27-28 years earlier; this distance corresponds approximately to the mean 
age at childbearing in 1968-1994. 
Source: Council of Europe (2006) and Eurostat (2008, 2009) for the period TFR; Statistics 
Denmark (2007) (Tab. 2.5 and 2.6) for the CTFR.
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We are well aware of the shortcomings of the Bongaarts-Feeney adjustment, such 
as its simplifi ed underlying assumption about the constant shape of fertility sched-
ule, its lack of controlling for changes in the parity distribution of the female popula-
tion and its relatively strong fl uctuations over time (van Imhoff 2001; Schoen 2004). 
However, we use it alongside the adjusted PATFR* for the reason of data availability 
and also because in most cases, it gives similar results to the other fertility adjust-
ment methods. We do not dispose for a number of countries with potentially more 
appropriate indexes based on parity and duration since the last birth, which largely 
eliminate the need for tempo adjustment (Sobotka et al. 2005; Ní Bhrolcháin 2008). 
We provide a brief description of the indicators used in the Appendix.
Example 1: The assumed gap between desired and actual fertility
Surveys on fertility ideals and intentions frequently indicate that despite the decline 
in fertility rates well below the replacement-level threshold, both mean ideal and 
desired family sizes in most countries of Europe remain at or above two children 
per woman (e.g. Testa 2007). The period TFR has been repeatedly used to estimate 
this gap, suggesting a huge aggregate discrepancy between actual and intended 
fertility (see also Bongaarts 2008), often in the order of 0.5-0.8 children per woman 
(e.g. Chesnais 2000). A recent OECD analysis (OECD 2007: 36) posits that “the gaps 
between desired and actual fertility rates have increased over the past ten to twenty 
years” and suggests that these gaps are largest in countries where fertility rates 
are lowest. Several distinct explanations of this discrepancy have been proposed, 
among which institutional and structural constraints to childbearing and childrear-
ing (McDonald 2006) are frequently taken as evidence of a need for policy action 
(European Commission 2005; McDonald 2006). 
The issue has been empirically illustrated by Lutz (2007); this illustration is fur-
ther elaborated in Table 1. It combines four different fertility and family size indica-
tors in major regions of the European Union (EU). The fi rst column lists the personal 
ideal family size as collected in the Eurobarometer survey in 2006 for women aged 
25-39 (Testa 2006). The second column, also based on Eurobarometer, gives the 
total intended family size for the same group of women. It combines the number 
of children already born with the number of children women intend to have in the 
future. This second measure constitutes a more realistic predictor of fertility than 
ideal family size, since it takes into account expected obstacles and diffi culties in re-
alising their fertility ideals and desires. However, a comparison between these two 
measures from the same survey shows that there is only a small difference between 
them, 0.15 children per woman for the whole EU. 
The third and fourth columns in Table 1 list the TFR for 2006 and the Bongaarts-
Feeney (1998) tempo-adjusted TFR* for 2005-2007 as published in the European 
Demographic Data Sheet (VID 2010). The difference between the conventional TFR 
and the ideal family size (Gap 1 in Column 5) is indeed substantial – more than 
half a child in all regions – and reaches 0.7 children for the EU. However, the two 
fi gures used to construct this gap are not comparable because they measure very 
different things, one cohort ideals and the other tempo-distorted period fertility. 
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If one wishes to compare the ideal family size to a period fertility measure, then 
tempo-adjusted TFR* would be more appropriate. As Column 6 shows, the gap 
between those two indexes (Gap 2) becomes smaller and reaches 0.5 for the whole 
EU. The last column fi nally indicates a third kind of gap, namely that between the 
intended family size and the adjusted TFR*. This third gap is the smallest of all, rang-
ing around 0.3-0.4 for different regions and reaching 0.34 for the EU; it represents 
about half of Gap 1. 
These data make the population policy rationale aiming at helping couples re-
duce the presumed gap between desires and reality look much less convincing: 
Does this imply that governments have little reason to take action in countries like 
Austria and Germany that have a relatively small aggregate gap, but in the view of 
their governments undesirably low fertility rates? Probably it does not. On the other 
hand, high-fertility countries of northern Europe have a somewhat larger gap when 
measured this way. Should governments be more active in countries which have a 
higher overall level of fertility? Probably they should not. In fact, Nordic countries, 
which have similar “fertility gaps” as other countries, are often cited as examples 
of what kind of policies governments in low-fertility countries should introduce in 
order to make it easier for couples to combine work and family. Hence the policy 
paradigm based on the presumed “unmet need for children” is problematic on both 
counts; to some extent it refl ects wishful thinking of policy makers and their implicit 
pronatalism.
While this analysis based on the Eurobarometer data (Testa 2006; Lutz 2007) 
clearly illustrates the issue, there are some justifi ed doubts about the validity and 
representativeness of this type of data from an opinion survey with limited sam-
Tab. 1: Ideal and intended family size and the period TFR of women in various 
regions of the EU in 2006 and different ways to calculate the ‘gap’ 
between ideal (intended) and actual fertility
 (1) 
Personal 
ideal 
family size 
(2) 
Actual + 
intended 
family size 
(3) 
TFR 
 
(4) 
Tempo 
adjusted 
TFR* 
(5) 
Gap 1 
(1)-(3) 
(6) 
Gap 2 
(1)–(4) 
(7) 
Gap 3 
(2)-(4) 
Western Europe 2.44 2.36 1.88 2.05 0.56 0.39 0.31 
Northern Europe 2.57 2.35 1.85 1.95 0.72 0.62 0.41 
Southern Europe 2.08 1.81 1.37 1.46 0.71 0.61 0.35 
Austria + Germany 2.07 1.88 1.34 1.62 0.74 0.45 0.25 
Central-Eastern 
Europe 2.09 2.04 1.31 1.60 0.79 0.50 0.44 
EU-27 2.21 2.06 1.53 1.72 0.68 0.49 0.34 
Note: Data are weighted by population size of countries in given regions.
Source: Columns (1) and (2): Eurobarometer 2006 data analysed by Testa (2006). (3) and 
(4): VID 2010
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ple size (typically around 130 female respondents aged 25-39 per country), which 
vastly increases the potential margin of error (Testa 2006). Moreover, comparisons 
between intentions and period fertility rates are problematic. They relate the cohort 
intentions for children to be born in the future to the period measures of recent 
fertility behaviour. A comparison of intended fertility among selected cohorts of 
women, expressed when they were in their prime reproductive years, with their 
fi nal completed fertility, is methodologically preferable. Hence, we also present a 
more in-depth analysis, using data from comparatively large surveys from Austria 
and England and Wales. We compare the intended family size, which best refl ects 
women’s and couples’ long-term childbearing plans with their completed cohort 
fertility.
In fact, cohort analysis leads to conclusions that are very similar to the com-
parison based on adjusted period measures discussed above. In England and Wales 
different cohorts of women who were interviewed at age 27-29 about their fertility 
plans expressed the mean intended family size (MIFS) to be about 0.3-0.4 higher 
than the period TFR at that time (see Smallwood/Jefferies 2003 for trends in MIFS 
over time). However, the eventual gap between their intentions and the ultimately 
achieved fertility level was reduced by about half and typically reached only 0.1-0.2 
(Tab. 2).
Similarly, in Austria the period TFR also gives an exaggerated picture of the ex-
tent of unrealised fertility desires. At the time Austrian women reach their typical 
Tab. 2: Difference between the mean intended family size (MIFS), period TFR 
and CTFR in England and Wales (women aged 27-29, period 1979-1996)
  MIFS Period 
TFR 
Gap 1 CTFR Gap 2 
Years Cohort (1) (2) (2)-(1) (3) (3)-(1) 
1979-81 around 1952 2.12 1.84 0.28 2.05 0.07 
1982-84 around 1955 2.16 1.76 0.40 2.02 0.14 
1985-87 around 1958 2.16 1.79 0.37 1.99 0.17 
1988-90 around 1961 2.20 1.82 0.38 1.96 0.24 
1991-93 around 1964 2.09 1.79 0.30 1.92 (est) 0.17 
1994-96 around 1967 2.14 1.74 0.40 1.91 (est.)  0.23 
Average   2.15 1.79 0.36 1.98 0.17 
Notes: MIFS refers to the mean intended family size among women aged 27-29; answers 
of undecided respondents were ignored (see Smallwood/Jefferies 2003 for al-
ternative estimates of the MIFS based on different assumptions about uncertain 
respondents).
 Data on the CTFR are partly estimated for cohorts born around 1964 and 1967. 
Source: MIFS: Smallwood/Jefferies 2003, Tab. 1. CTFR: ONS 2007, Tab. 10.2: 56-57.
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age at childbearing the gap between their mean reproductive desires and the con-
temporary level of TFR commonly widens to 0.4-0.5. However, a comparison of 
fertility intentions at younger ages with completed fertility shows that the intention-
behaviour gap becomes substantially smaller, specifi cally, around 0.15 in the case 
of the cohorts 1955-60 and 1966-70 analysed in Figure 2. This fi nding is again sur-
prisingly consistent with the conclusions based on period-based tempo-adjusted 
measures of fertility. Our detailed investigation of period fertility rates and fertility 
intentions in the Czech Republic after 1990, when the country underwent a dramatic 
fall in total fertility, also yields similar conclusions. In 1997, when the period TFR 
dropped to 1.18, the gap between the mean intended family size and the period TFR 
surpassed 0.8, whereas the tempo-adjusted TFR* indicated a much smaller gap of 
0.3 (Tab. 2 in Sobotka/Lutz 2009: 14 ).
Fig. 2: Differences between mean intended family size (MIFS), period TFR 
and CTFR, Austrian women aged 25-30 (years 1986 and 1996, cohorts 
1956-1960 and 1966-1970)
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Notes: MIFS refers to the medium variant estimate of the mean desired family size among 
women aged 25-30 (see Sobotka 2009).
Data on the CTFR are partly estimated for the cohorts born in 1966-1970. 
Source: Sobotka’s (2009) computation from Microcensus (1986 and 1996) data
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All in all, period measures of fertility that are less distorted by changes in fertility 
timing than the period TFR as well as the ultimately achieved cohort fertility show 
that the gap between intended and realised fertility is grossly exaggerated when 
analysed with the period TFR. If the intentions data were further adjusted for some 
factors that are mostly outside the reach of government policies, such as having 
no suitable partner, disagreement between partners or poor health status, the pre-
sumed gap might become entirely erased. A French survey analysed by Toulemon 
and Leridon (1999) revealed that when women who had never lived with a partner 
were disregarded, the mean ideal family size at ages 25-35 (2.21) corresponded re-
markably well with the eventually achieved mean family size (2.23) among women 
born in 1950-65. 
Caution needs to be taken when interpreting these fi ndings. The proper measure-
ment of intentions and their correspondence with realised fertility is not settled just 
by properly accounting for tempo effect and remains challenging even when more 
appropriate indicators than the period TFR are used. Aggregate consistency does 
not mean that most individuals achieve their intended family size. Fertility intentions 
are often uncertain (Westoff/Ryder 1977; Morgan 1981; Sobotka 2009) and subject 
to changes and revisions during the life course (Quesnel-Vallée/Morgan 2004; Lief-
broer 2009). The aggregate results represent an outcome of both under-achieving 
and over-achieving of the initial targets among individual women. Furthermore, the 
concepts of intended and ideal family size can both be criticised. The defi nition of 
intended fertility adds the number of children already born to those still intended, 
which makes any unplanned births in the past part of the total intended family size. 
Even in European countries with high contraceptive use and broad access to abor-
tion, unplanned births push both the intended and realised fertility rate slightly up-
wards. This problem is avoided by the more hypothetical personal ideal family size 
which, on the other hand, is more detached from individual circumstances affecting 
reproductive behaviour, including infertility, and thus also harder to interpret.
Example 2: Recent increase in the period TFR in Europe 
Since the late 1990s many countries of Europe have recorded a notable increase in 
the period total fertility. In Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Ireland, Latvia, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Ukraine the 
TFR increased by more than 0.2 between 2000 and 2008 (Goldstein et al. 2009). 
This has been generally interpreted as a welcome sign, indicating the much-needed 
reversal of the previous long-standing trend of declining period fertility rates, which 
in many countries of Europe had brought the TFR to “lowest-low” levels of 1.3 or 
below (Kohler et al. 2002). Some governments have proudly attributed this trend 
to their policy action and a leading newspaper in Germany, Die Zeit, commented 
a tiny increase in the number of births in 2007 with the cheerful pronouncement 
“politics work!” (Gaschke 2009). However, an alternative explanation provides a dif-
ferent perspective on the recent rise in the period TFR. It is possible that much of 
the recent increase in the period TFR in European countries can be attributed to the 
slowing down or ending of fertility postponement (Goldstein et al. 2009, Bongaarts/
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Sobotka 2010). We look at fertility changes in two countries – the Czech Republic 
and Spain – which have experienced a substantial rise in the period TFR since the 
late 1990s and for which we could compute alternative indicators of period fertility 
that are less affected by the tempo effect. A systematic analysis of the role of tempo 
effects in the recent TFR increase is provided in recent studies by Goldstein et al. 
(2009) and Bongaarts and Sobotka (2010).
Spain experienced a steep and continuous decline in the period TFR between 
1976 and 1996, when it reached a record-low level of 1.17. At the same time the 
alternative tempo-adjusted indicators of period fertility also displayed an almost 
continuous fall, although at somewhat higher levels, suggesting that the fertility 
“quantum” fell in parallel with the period TFR (Fig. 3). After 1996 the TFR fi rst sta-
bilised and then started rising, peaking at 1.46 in 2008 (e.g. Delgado et al. 2008). 
However, the tempo-adjusted fertility indicators give another perspective on recent 
fertility “reversal”. First, they suggest that fertility was declining until 2000, i.e. dur-
ing the time when the TFR had stabilised and started to increase. Subsequently, 
these indicators essentially show a stabilisation in period fertility. In effect, there 
was convergence between the period TFR and the adjusted period fertility meas-
ures around 2005 when the increase in the mean age at fi rst birth stopped. This is a 
nice illustration of the expected consequence of the ending of the tempo effect. 
A different story is depicted in Figure 3 for the Czech Republic. A massive post-
ponement of childbearing after the collapse of the state-socialist system has taken 
place there since the early 1990s, bringing a pronounced rise in the mean age at 
fi rst birth (Sobotka et al. 2008). In parallel, the TFR had fallen to the level of 1.13 in 
1999 and then started a gradual recovery since the early 2000s, reaching 1.50 in 
2008. The adjusted TFR* as well as the age- and parity-specifi c index of fertility, the 
PATFR*, adjusted for tempo effects (Kohler/Ortega’s 2002 adjustment, see Appen-
dix) fell much less precipitously over the 1990s to a level around 1.6 in 1998. This 
divergence between the ordinary TFR and the tempo-adjusted indicators suggests 
that a substantial part of the steep drop in the TFR could be attributed to the tempo 
effect. In contrast to Spain, a rise in the TFR in the early 2000s occurred in tandem 
with an increase in the adjusted TFR*, albeit a less intensive one. It is likely that 
the continuing rise in the ordinary TFR will bring a gradual convergence between 
different fertility measures in the future, in reaction to a slowing down of fertility 
postponement.
In these two cases, and many others not discussed here (e.g. Goldstein et al. 
2009), the adjusted indicators offer a different interpretation of recent fertility trends 
than the ordinary TFR. Whereas the TFR provides an impression of a substantial in-
crease in fertility rates, the adjusted indicators often show that this increase was 
almost entirely (Spain) or largely (Czech Republic) driven by the diminishing tempo 
distortion.
This explanation is particularly pertinent for fi rst births, for which the recent rise 
in the TFR was most clearly manifested. To illustrate this point, we compare the 
ordinary TFR for birth order 1 in Spain with the period fertility index based on age-
specifi c probabilities of having the fi rst child computed for childless women (PAT-
FR), which is markedly less affected by the tempo effect (Sobotka 2004b), and by its 
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Fig. 3: Period TFR, TFR*, PATFR* index for total births and mean age at fi rst 
birth (MAFB) in Spain (1980-2007) and the Czech Republic (1988-2008)
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adjusted variant (PATFR*) computed using a simplifi ed version (Sobotka 2004b: 94) 
of Kohler and Ortega’s (2002) adjustment (see Appendix; see Sobotka/Lutz 2009 for 
an additional example of fi rst birth trends in the Czech Republic).2
These three indexes provide contrasting impressions about the trends and levels 
of fi rst-birth rates. Between 1980, when they stood at around 0.9 (suggesting 10 % 
childlessness) and 2005-2007, when they generally converged, although at a lower 
level around 0.8, the fi rst-order TFR had dramatically fallen to 0.57 in 1996 and sub-
sequently rose by a third during the next decade (Fig. 4). In contrast, the fi rst-order 
PATFR* depicts a gradual fall between 1980 and 1996 followed by a stabilisation. In 
other words, fi rst-birth intensity did not rise after 1996 and almost all the increase in 
fi rst-order TFR in Spain can be explained by a mechanical effect of a steep increase 
in the number of childless women at higher childbearing ages, when fi rst-birth in-
tensities remained relatively high and stable. This effect is not accounted for in 
order-specifi c TFR, which does not control for shifts in the parity distribution among 
women. Finally, when taking both tempo- and parity-composition effects into ac-
count the adjusted PATFR* suggests that fi rst-birth intensities actually declined be-
tween 1996 and 2006.
In sum, during the recent period the ordinary TFR usually indicates a larger mag-
nitude of change, especially for fi rst births, than fertility indicators which control for 
parity, duration, tempo effect, or at least some of these potentially distorting fac-
tors. Most of the TFR shifts can be explained by an increase in fi rst-order TFR and, 
in turn, most of the increase in fi rst-order TFR can be explained by a diminishing 
tempo effect coupled with an increase in the number of childless women at later 
childbearing ages. The often dramatic reversals in fi rst-order TFR can be seen as a 
product of two distinct phases of fi rst-birth postponement. During the fi rst phase, 
many cohorts of women delayed their entry into motherhood, causing a decline in 
the TFR. In a second phase, however, they began realising their “postponed” child-
bearing, contributing thus to the recuperation of fertility rates at higher reproduc-
tive ages, which pushed the ordinary TFR upwards. The analysis of fi rst-birth rates, 
where the cycle of fertility delay and subsequent recuperation is most apparent and 
fuels large shifts in the fi rst-order TFR, best exposes the weaknesses of the conven-
tional period total fertility when it is used as a measure of childbearing intensity or 
as a synthetic cohort indicator of the “number of children per woman”.
Example 3: TFR as a problematic measure of the fertility of immigrants
Fertility of immigrants, when measured by the period TFR, is subject to yet anoth-
er type of distortion linked to the endogeneity of migration for fertility. Immigrant 
women, especially when migration took place for the purpose of family formation, 
2 We do not employ the Bongaarts-Feeney TFR* in the analysis of fi rst births, as this indicator is 
rather unstable when analysed by birth order. This issue has been addressed by Bongaarts and 
Feeney (2006) who proposed parity-specifi c fertility adjustment (see also Bongaarts/Sobotka 
2010). However, the inclusion of this new indicator would “burden” our study with yet another 
index of fertility and we decided not to use it here.
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typically show elevated fertility rates during the fi rst years after their arrival (e.g. 
Alders 2000; Østby 2002; Andersson 2004; Toulemon/Mazuy 2004). Consequently, 
their fertility rates are often more closely related to the duration of their stay rather 
than to their age. The total fertility, which takes age as the indexing variable of fertil-
ity, may therefore be strongly biased by the size of immigration streams: Even when 
fertility rates computed by the duration of stay in the country remain stable, in-
creased migration would bring an infl ated TFR by increasing the number of migrant 
women with short durations of stay, when their fertility rates are highest. Thus, the 
TFR computed for immigrants usually exaggerates their fertility quantum during 
periods of high immigration. 
This distortion becomes yet more serious when the data on births are recorded 
for women with foreign nationality only, rather than for all women of immigrant 
origin. As many immigrants undergo a process of naturalisation when they stay in a 
country for many years and at some point become classifi ed as nationals, foreign-
ers frequently constitute a select group of migrants with relatively short duration of 
stay and thus also with elevated period total fertility. Therefore, some researchers 
Fig. 4: Period TFR, PATFR and PATFR* for fi rst births, Spain 1980-2007
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have argued that the period TFR cannot serve as a reliable indicator of the level of 
immigrants’ fertility (Andersson 2004; Toulemon 2004). The selectivity of foreign-
nationality migrants and the methodological shortcomings of the TFR may explain 
why several European countries record the TFR for foreign women as high as 3.0 
and above (e.g. Sobotka 2008). For instance, the TFR for foreign women in France in 
2005 was estimated at 3.29 as compared with 1.80 for women with French national-
ity (Héran/Pison 2007). 
Not much research has been conducted yet to correct for this type of distortion 
in the TFR. Alternative estimates of migrant women’s TFR for France controlling for 
age at entry and duration of stay (Toulemon 2004; Toulemon/Mazuy 2004) consti-
tute the main exception. For 1991-1998 this alternative estimate reduced the TFR of 
immigrant women in France from 2.50 (estimated by using the conventional TFR) 
to 2.16. Thus, the “excess” fertility of immigrant women in France as compared to 
native women, falls to about one half of its estimated level, from 0.85 to 0.46 when 
a more appropriate fertility indicator is used (Toulemon 2004: 4). 
Example 4: Changes in family policies and shifts in TFR 
So far our analysis has not referred explicitly to family policies. There is an increas-
ing body of evidence that family-related policies can stimulate distinct swings in 
total fertility, which are often primarily induced by changes in fertility timing and 
spacing rather than by an increase in the underlying fertility quantum (Gauthier 
2007). Specifi cally, policies may stimulate earlier entry into parenthood or, which is 
more frequently the case, a faster progression to higher-order births. 
The effects of changes in family policies on the timing of births have been doc-
umented for many European countries. For instance, Sweden constitutes a well-
studied example of a sudden upswing in second- and third-birth rates at short birth 
intervals. This upswing followed two extensions of parental leave, which granted 
a continuous provision of paid parental leave benefi t amounting to 80 % of their 
previous salary (90 % until 1994) to women who had another child within 24 months 
from 1980 and 30 months from 1986 (e.g. Hoem 1990; Andersson et al. 2006; Neyer/
Andersson 2008). This regulation, which became known as “speed premium”, has 
led to a shortening of birth intervals and contributed to a distinct upward swing in 
period TFR in the late 1980s, as many parents found it manageable to have children 
closely spaced to take advantage of the continuous benefi t (Hoem 1990). 
Less well-known are the effects of policy changes introduced in Russia since 
1982. These policies extended the period of maternity leave and, more importantly, 
they also extended the options for mothers to take child care leave until the child 
reached age 3 (see Zakharov 2006 and 2008; note that unlike in Sweden child care 
leave compensation remained low in Russia). Following this new regulation, the 
TFR in Russia increased from 1.88 in 1981 to 2.09 in 1983 and, after a short pause, to 
2.23 in 1987 (Council of Europe 2006). However, what looks like a successful policy 
intervention that brought about a desired increase in fertility was mostly an indirect 
effect of a change in the timing of childbearing, bringing a temporary boost to the 
period TFR. The mean age at fi rst birth slightly declined, but the most pronounced 
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effect was recorded for women with one child, who were giving birth to their second 
child at considerably shorter intervals. In a period perspective, this second-birth in-
terval fell from around 5.5 to 3.5 years between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s 
(Zakharov 2008, Fig. 5: 928). Although second children were born much “faster” 
than before, especially among women born in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, 
Zakharov (2008: 927) did not detect any increase in their second birth progression 
rate. He concludes that “the demographic effect of the policy did not manifest itself 
in an increase in average family size in any major social groups.” 
However, not only the period TFR is very sensitive to changes in the timing of 
childbearing. Changes in birth intervals, which are frequent by-products of family 
policy changes, also affect period parity progression rates (PPRs), computed from 
duration-specifi c fertility rates. Breton and Prioux’s (2005) detailed analysis of shifts 
in third-birth rates in France in the 1970s to 1990s reveal that third-birth PPRs have 
fl uctuated in parallel with an introduction of family policies explicitly aimed at pro-
moting third births (set up in 1978-1980 and again in 1985-87) as well as with the 
scaling-down of those measures in 1982. As in the previous two cases, these poli-
cies had primarily led to the temporary compression of birth intervals – in this case 
between the second and the third birth – and had only a limited effect on cohort fer-
tility rates (Breton/Prioux 2005: 423; cohorts were defi ned as parity cohorts which 
measure progression rates to third birth among women having a second birth in a 
given year). 
3 Discussion and conclusions 
This study has discussed four examples of different situations where the use of the 
period TFR results in erroneous readings of the levels and trends of period fertility, 
which in turn may lead to incorrect policy conclusions and, potentially, to misguided 
policies. We have focused prominently on the infl uence of tempo distortions that 
have considerably affected levels and trends in the period TFR across Europe since 
the early 1970s.
Our fi rst example makes it clear that the popular and politically convenient policy 
rationale according to which governments should only try to help couples fi ll the 
gap between their desired and actual family size is ambiguous and often not very 
signifi cant in terms of quantity. We arrive at the same conclusion when using adjust-
ed period measures as well as when using the more appropriate cohort comparison 
of fertility intentions among women of reproductive age and their later reproductive 
outcomes. A much smaller aggregate difference between intended and realised fer-
tility – typically about a half of the difference estimated from the period TFR – can be 
more easily explained by biological and social obstacles to childbearing (Bongaarts 
2008) that are largely outside the scope of policy infl uences, such as poor health, 
infertility, or an inability to fi nd a suitable partner.  
Our second example refl ects upon the most widely documented distortion in the 
period TFR – its sensitivity to changes in the timing of childbearing. We show that 
the period TFR may suggest too low fertility levels and subsequently signal a trend 
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reversal and a substantial increase in fertility where other indicators show stagna-
tion or even a slight downward trend (the example of fi rst births in Spain). The 
difference between the period TFR and the more appropriate measures of period 
or cohort fertility level may be of major magnitude, potentially leading to a gross 
misinterpretation of fertility in a country (the examples of the Czech Republic and 
Denmark). Our analysis indicates that most of the recent increase in the period TFR 
has been driven by the rise in the TFR for fi rst births, which can in turn be largely 
attributed to the diminishing fi rst-birth postponement combined with a previous 
increase in the number of childless women at later childbearing ages (see also Gold-
stein et al. 2009). This fi nding has an important policy corollary: while the rising TFR 
may be interpreted by some governments and politicians as proving the positive ef-
fects of their social or family policies on fertility, our fi ndings leave much less space 
for such a cheerful interpretation. 
Our third example draws on the existing research on fertility of immigrant wom-
en. The fact that the TFR often distorts the picture of immigrants’ fertility may poten-
tially lead to ill-informed policy efforts addressing the presumably high difference 
between fertility of migrant and native-born women. Our fourth example turns to 
policy effects themselves. Many fertility-related policies primarily affect the timing 
of childbearing and as a result they also bring a temporary shift in the period TFR 
without shaping cohort fertility trends. This shift, caused mostly by the tempo ef-
fect, may please policymakers who are likely to incorrectly interpret it as a welcome 
sign of the turnaround in fertility rates, following the new policy measures. 
Let us now turn to the second question mentioned in the introduction, namely 
whether there is any role left for the traditional period TFR. We have presented clear 
evidence that it may grossly distort any policy-relevant analysis. Does this imply 
that the use of period TFR should be entirely abandoned? On a theoretical level the 
answer essentially depends on whether or not the period TFR adequately measures 
and describes some process that can be meaningfully interpreted and that other 
fertility indicators do not capture in the same way (see also Ní Bhrolcháin 2007 and 
2008). In the spectrum of summary indicators of natality and period fertility that 
ranges from the absolute number of births per year (infl uenced by population size, 
age structure, parity and birth interval distribution of women, as well as tempo ef-
fects) at one end to parity, age and duration-specifi c indexes on the other, the period 
TFR occupies an odd in-between position. It adjusts for population size and age 
structure but not for parity and birth intervals distribution or tempo effect. The deci-
sive point then is whether there are any meaningful questions for which the answer 
would be provided by an indicator which only adjusts for age structure and not for 
other potentially important factors. By extension, this question also pertains to the 
issue of the factors that should be controlled for in an ideal fertility index of choice 
(see Population 1994). In theory, such a list can be extended to include factors like 
infertility, partnership status of women, or even their education status or fertility 
preferences (only women wishing to have a child in a given year would be included 
in at-risk population). However, lack of data, measurement and computational prob-
lems as well as interpretation diffi culties imply that the list of characteristics to be 
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controlled for in any useful fertility index should be limited to the most essential 
ones. 
We could not come up with a policy-relevant question for which the period TFR 
would be our indicator of choice. All questions that were considered in the end 
either related to age structure, cohort size or population growth for which the sim-
ple natality indicators provide the adequate answer or pertained to childbearing 
behaviour, such as the question whether a certain policy has led to a higher fertility 
rate. The latter question, in order to be adequately addressed, requires controlling 
for parity or duration composition and tempo effect or turning to a cohort fertility 
analysis. The only instances for which we could identify a role for the period TFR is 
the artifi cial realm of models of age-structured population dynamics constructed by 
demographers. And of course, in this realm the TFR still provides the best answer 
to the question “Did the TFR increase?” And since the TFR is such an established 
measure, a lot of people will keep asking this question.
The infl uence of the changing timing of childbearing on the period TFR is in 
our view particularly pertinent to current policy debates and proposals. Although 
the efforts to eliminate the tempo effect from period fertility measures remain by 
defi nition imperfect and subject to criticism, they are in our view worth undertak-
ing. Policy-relevant questions are usually concerned with the “quantum” of fertility, 
including the issues of anticipating future period and cohort fertility levels as well as 
population prospects or explaining trends and reversals in fertility. Often, the pre-
sumed mismatch between fertility intentions and behaviour is largely a by-product 
of using period indicators of fertility, where the tempo effect strongly biases both 
the analysis and the resulting conclusions. Also from the perspective of shorter-
term trends and reversals in fertility, most policies that have potential effects on 
fertility are arguably “quantum-oriented”: If, for instance, a new system of parental 
leave is established, few politicians hoping that it may have a positive and lasting 
infl uence on fertility would be content to learn that this infl uence may vanish after a 
couple of years, because it would primarily operate through a tempo effect boost-
ing the period TFR. 
However, “tempo policies,” aiming to stimulate earlier timing of childbearing in 
order to give a temporary boost to the number of births without necessarily af-
fecting completed fertility, make up a legitimate and potentially useful goal (Lutz/
Skirbekk 2005, Rindfuss/Brauner-Otto 2008). These policies in fact constitute an ex-
ception, where the TFR could give a useful signal about their effects, although the 
analysis of trends in total number of births and in tempo-adjusted fertility indicators 
and parity progression ratios would be equally valuable.
With this exception in mind, these considerations seem to imply that there is 
indeed little use for the period TFR outside the models constructed by demogra-
phers. Still, these considerations are “theoretical” because they are contingent on 
the availability of a broadly accepted better indicator of period quantum. While there 
are many useful indicators, we are unable to recommend any one as a “default” in-
dicator of choice, since they are based on different underlying models of behaviour 
that are not universally accepted (Population 1994) and that may not suit all types of 
measurement purposes (Ní Bhrolcháin 2007, 2008). Given this situation, a parallel 
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use of several indicators, carefully selected on the basis of data availability and also 
of the research question asked or the policy goal formulated, should be considered 
(Ní Bhrolcháin 2008). If the aim is to get information on the average childbearing 
intensity in a given year (the period quantum of fertility), we recommend choosing 
parity progression ratios, tempo-adjusted PATFR*s or adjusted TFR*s, or other in-
dicators that at least partly reduce the distorting infl uences of age structure, parity 
distribution and the tempo effect. Especially the use of duration- and parity-specifi c 
fertility measures would provide a much better understanding of policy effects on 
fertility than the ordinary TFR can offer (Ní Bhrolcháin 1987, 1992, 2008). Recently 
initiated efforts to collect and compute detailed and unifi ed sets of parity-specifi c 
fertility indicators within the framework of the Human Fertility Database (www.hu-
manfertility.org) should make a wider use of such indicators much easier in the fu-
ture. Ultimately, cohort fertility data are best suited to analyse whether specifi c poli-
cies have had a lasting effect or whether there was a discontinuity in fertility trends 
among the cohorts that reacted most strongly to the policy changes. While ordinary 
cohort fertility data, specifi ed by year-of-birth cohorts require a long “waiting time” 
for each cohort to complete its reproductive history, data for parity cohorts, namely, 
fertility rates and parity progression ratios specifi ed by duration since last previous 
birth can reduce this drawback (Breton/Prioux 2005 and Hosseini-Chavoshi et al. 
2006 constitute nice recent examples of such analysis).3
Our fi ndings on the problematic use and interpretation of the period TFR, which 
should be avoided where possible, are in agreement with earlier arguments of 
prominent analysts like Norman Ryder (1990), Máire Ní Bhrolcháin (1992, 2008), 
Jean-Louis Rallu and Laurent Toulemon (1994b) and John Bongaarts and Griffi th 
Feeney (1998). While we also generally agree with a recent conclusion offered by 
Neyer and Andersson (2007: 22) who proposed that crude measures of fertility, 
such as the TFR, cannot serve as appropriate measures of policy effects, we do not 
fully support their claim that an accurate information on fertility changes following 
the changes in family policies can only be derived from individual-level data (see 
also Neyer/Andersson 2008). While this may be true for the study of differential fer-
tility behaviour, a carefully drawn interpretation of a wide range of aggregate level 
fertility indicators can provide crucial insights into the nature of fertility changes. 
This enables researchers to draw frequently valid and important causal inferences 
concerning specifi c new policies or other social and economic changes (Ní Bhrol-
cháin/Dyson 2007; Šťastná/Sobotka 2009). 
In conclusion, there is a strong case for stopping the use of the period TFR as 
a one-fi ts-all fertility indicator which is currently common practice. While demog-
raphers are increasingly aware of the pitfalls associated with the period TFR, their 
continuous reliance on this measure fuels large misperceptions of fertility levels and 
dynamics among policy makers, the media and the general public. As a minimum 
3 Note that in Austria, duration-specifi c parity progression ratios are regularly computed and 
published within the Geburtenbarometer project that monitors period fertility trends (see http://
www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/barometer/index.html).
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reporting standard, demographers who still choose to use the period TFR should 
stop referring to it as the “mean number of children per woman”, which it evidently 
is not. The choice of the most appropriate indicator must depend on the question 
asked. Since it is hard to think of a real-world question for which the TFR would be 
the indicator of choice there are good reasons for abandoning it altogether in com-
munications with non-demographic audiences who almost inevitably will misinter-
pret it as a cohort measure. But such a radical solution may be premature as long 
as there is no widely accepted and easily available alternative. Hence, for pragmatic 
reasons, the TFR should remain in use as part of a bouquet of fertility indicators. 
As the period TFR is most widely available and it often rises and falls in line with 
other indicators it is still worth being calculated and inspected. But its misleading 
“cohort” interpretation should be avoided and, wherever possible, more appropri-
ate indicators should be used. 
When René Kuczynski fi rst proposed total fertility a century ago at the Inter-
national Congress on Hygiene and Demography in Berlin in 1907 (see Kuczynski 
1932 [1982]) it was a major innovation in fertility research. But at least since 1946, 
when order-specifi c fertility indexes controlling for the parity of mothers have been 
devised by Pascal K. Whelpton, methodologically superior period fertility meas-
ures have become available. As in economics, where the use and computations of 
mainstream measures like the Gross Domestic Product, gets repeatedly revised and 
questioned (Stiglitz et al. 2009), it is time in demographers to go beyond the period 
TFR in routine fertility reporting and policy communications. Given that it has be-
come so dear to many cohorts of demographers and data users it would take quite 
a while for the period TFR to lose its dominant position even if the points made in 
this article were readily accepted. We hope nevertheless that our study will stimu-
late a discourse about the best practice of fertility reporting and will contribute to 
the broader dissemination of different fertility measures which will more accurately 
inform policy makers and the public at large about the aspects of fertility change 
that matter for their questions.
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Appendix: Fertility indicators used in this study
Besides the period and cohort total fertility rates, specifi ed separately for fi rst births 
and for total birth orders, this study uses the following indicators of period fertility:
Tempo-adjusted total fertility (TFR*), developed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998), 
is computed as a sum of order-specifi c adjusted TFR*s, which take order-specifi c 
changes in the mean age of fertility schedule as an adjustment factor:
TFRi(t)* = TFRi(t) / (1-ri(t)), 
where ri(t) is the estimated change in the mean age at childbearing of birth order 
i between the beginning and the end of year t. Following Bongaarts and Feeney 
(2000: 563, fn. 1), this is estimated as follows:
ri(t) = [MABi(t+1) – MABi(t-1)] / 2, 
where MABi(t) is the mean age of fertility schedule of order i, calculated from 
age-specifi c fertility rates by birth order (incidence rates which do not control for 
parity distribution). Since the TFR* displays considerable annual fl uctuations, three-
year moving averages are used in this study. 
Fertility index controlling for age and parity (PATFR) is computed from a set of age 
and parity-specifi c birth probabilities, qi(a), which serve as an input of multistate 
fertility tables (e.g. Park 1976). Following Rallu and Toulemon (1994a: 66), order-
specifi c birth probabilities are computed directly from the annual data on live births 
by age of mother (a) and birth order (i) combined with the parity and age structure 
of the female population at the beginning of a given year:
qi(a,t) = Bi(a,t) / PF,i-1(a,T=January 1 of t).
This equation expresses the probability that a woman aged a and having i-1 children 
at the beginning of a year t will give birth during the year. For more details of the 
computations used, see Sobotka (2004b: 44-46 and 92-93). For further information 
on age and parity-specifi c fertility index and its computation, see Park (1976), Rallu 
and Toulemon (1994a) and Barkalov and Dorbritz (1996). 
Tempo and variance-adjusted period fertility index controlling for age and parity 
(PATFR*).
This modifi cation of the PATFR index was proposed by Kohler and Ortega (2002). 
Their method provides an estimation of period fertility that is free of three distor-
tions present in the TFR, namely distortions caused by (1) changes in the parity 
distribution of women, (2) changes in fertility timing and (3) changes in the variance 
of the fertility schedule. It is an analogy of the method developed fi rst by Kohler 
and Philipov (2001) for an adjustment of age-specifi c fertility rates of the second 
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kind (incidence rates), specifi ed by birth order. The authors employ a procedure 
that iteratively corrects the observed mean age and the inferred tempo change for 
distortions caused by the variance effects (Kohler/Philipov 2001: 10). We employ a 
simplifi ed version of this adjustment, which is described in Sobotka (2004b: 94). As 
in the case of TFR*, we use three-year moving averages of the PATFR* to reduce 
random fl uctuations in this index.
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